Current approaches to the development of airport retail : a sales performance analysis and case study by Herring, Ahron B. (Ahron Benjamin), 1975-
Current Approaches to the Development of Airport Retail: 
 
A Sales Performance Analysis and Case Study 
 
by 
 
Ahron B. Herring 
 
M.B.A., 
 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002 
 
 
B.A., Mathematics, Physics, and Computer Science  
 
Yeshiva University, 1995 
 
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Science in Real Estate Development 
 
at the 
 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
September 2002 
 
 
© Copyright 2002 Ahron B. Herring.  
All rights reserved. 
 
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper 
and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part. 
 
Signature of Author................................................................................................................ 
Title Page  Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
August 2, 2002 
 
Certified by ............................................................................................................................ 
John T. Riordan 
Thomas G. Eastman Chairman 
Thesis Supervisor 
 
Accepted by............................................................................................................................ 
William C. Wheaton 
Chairman, Interdepartmental Degree Program in Real Estate Development 
 CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRPORT RETAIL: 
 
A SALES PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDY 
 
BY 
 
AHRON B. HERRING 
 
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
on August 2, 2002 in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Science in  
Real Estate Development 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
During the 1990s, a number of airports around the United States radically changed the 
way they managed the retail space in their terminals.  Departing from the traditional 
master concessionaire/operator model, airports began experimenting with branded direct 
leasing programs and outsourcing to third party developers.  Serving over 700 million 
domestic airline passengers annually, and until recently overlooked by the retail 
development community at large, the airport network presents a significant market for 
retail development.  We review the issues surrounding airport retail management, the 
genesis of the branded, mall-style and developer-run programs, and evaluate the relative 
performance of different management models both quantitatively and qualitatively, based 
on recent sales data and case studies of a number of airports. 
 
Data for this report was collected June/July 2002 in the form of publicly available data 
from industry trade groups and journals, interviews with members of airport business 
offices, developers active in airport retail, and firms providing concessionaire service to 
airports.  
 
 
Thesis Supervisor: John Riordan 
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Introduction 
 
The evolution of airport retailing 
 In the late 1980s, when you stood in line at the airport check- in counter, your 
thoughts might have wandered a bit – commenting to yourself on the how poorly the 
building was showing it s age, hoping the airplane was in better shape, and whether you’d 
have time to sit at the gate and enjoy the view of the planes taking off.  Taking a sip from 
that awful cup of caffeine- laced coffee, you might have found solace in the fact that at 
least the airline industry had some competition these days, but how could those 
stewardesses be so friendly this early in the morning. 
 Ten years later, the well- lit, vaulted ceilings in the new terminal makes for a more 
pleasant airport experience, but the booking agents seem so much more harried, and 
you’ve been in line for almost 45 minutes.  At least the java is decent, and you’ll have 
another hour to shop for that gift you’ve been meaning to get for your spouse, just before 
you sprint to your gate…to find out your plane has been delayed in Chicago.  You might 
as well check your email at the bank of kiosks while you wait…such is life on the road! 
 In the wake of September 11th, safety when traveling may be once again central in 
our minds in a way we thought gone forever, but the experience of traveling through an 
airport will never be the way it once was.  Since 1990, domestic air travel in the US has 
grown from 424 million passengers a year to over 708 million in 2000, and when you 
consider that for every one of those people arriving at the airport, you have someone 
getting off that plane, all told airports in the United States serve over a billion people a 
year.  Meanwhile, airport facilities have been renovated, but the inability of the aviation 
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network to keep up with that demand has meant an increase in delays, multiple 
connections and longer dwell times in the airport. 
 If the previous decade had been spent adapting the business of aviation to the new 
world of deregulation, the last ten years has seen a revolution in the airport as a 
commercial venue in it’s own right, with name brand retail stores, business productivity 
centers, even minute spas, become more and more commonplace.  This has been driven 
in part by changes in our culture, as we spend more time traveling greater distances in the 
course of our professional lives, but it is also due to a change in our expectations of a 
retail and shopping experience.  With Starbucks at every corner, a J Crew or The Limited 
not far away, and 24-hour pharmacies, our expectation for convenient, familiar 
conveniences no longer ends just because we’ll be traveling halfway across the country.  
With limited government funding and increasingly squeezed operating budgets, airports 
are run ‘like a business’, and if we’re spending the time and have money in our pockets, 
someone, somehow will be there to take it from us. 
 But behind the scenes, in the airport’s business office, someone has to make that 
miracle of modern capitalism possible.  Should the airport take on the job, tight staffed as 
it is?  Perhaps the concessionaire, who generally has great familiarity with and a long-
term commitment to operating in the airport environment, could run the operation.  Or 
perhaps they should outsource to a completely new breed of operator from outside the 
traditional boundary of the industry – the third-party manager-financier-developer – who 
has the contacts and resources to bring in and manage a program offering a broad variety 
of name brand products in a high service environment. 
- 7 - 
 All these variations have been tried over the course of the past ten years, and the 
grand experiment is not yet over.  The question we hope to begin to address here is how 
we have gotten from there to here, if there are indications that there are aspects of these 
various business models work better than others, and where the industry might be 
evolving. 
 
The airport network and organization 
The Federal Aviation Administration oversees the 3,304 commercial and general 
aviation airports that make up the national airport transportation system.  The top 419 are 
categorized as primary hub airports, which in 2000 carried over 708 million passengers, 
the great majority traveling through the 31 large hub (494 million, or 70%) and 35 
medium hub (135 million, 19%) airports1,2 (see Table 1.)  This ranking is based on the 
FAA’s measurement of an airport’s annual enplanements, which are defined as the 
number of passengers boarding a flight, including origination, stopovers and connections.  
While the total passenger volume at an airport is double that (as we pointed out, few 
people actually live in an airport, so in the aggregate there are roughly just as many 
people leaving the airport system as there are enplaning), the number of enplanements is 
considered the principal measure of passenger volume in an airport and, more 
importantly for our purposes, represents those passengers spend ing their time – and 
money – in the airport terminal while waiting for their flight. 
Most airports in the United States are public entities – either directly owned by 
the city, or incorporated, but serving the public trust.  To meet their operating and capital 
                                                 
1 ATA Airline Handbook 
2 FAA 2000 Primary Airport Enplanements Activity Summary 
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investment needs, airports rely on a broad range of funding sources: municipal airport 
bonds, federal and state grants and airport-generated income, which includes landing 
fees, passenger facility charges, fees paid by rental car companies, parking fees, facility 
rent and retail concessions.  In some airports these non-airplane related fees, concessions 
and rents contribute almost a third of the airport’s income.  Concession fees themselves 
may be only a few percent of a large airport’s operating budget, but they and the rents 
that those concessions generate are an essential part of the fiscal balancing act. 
 The retail environment in airports is driven by unique geographic constraints.  
The major distinction in the airport environment is between “ground-side” and “air-side”, 
a distinction that has been made much clearer to the traveling public and the airport 
retailer since 9/11.  Ground-side, “before” security, with ticketing and baggage handling, 
has traditionally been the place for an airport’s large open spaces.  There are many airport 
layouts, but generally there is a central terminal with connections to ground-side 
transportation (car or light rail), separated from the air-side concourses and boarding 
gates by a bank of security.  Once on the air-side, there is wide variation in the layout and 
capacity for retail.  Some concourses are short walks from the terminal, with the all gates 
visible before going through security.  Others are completely separate sections to the 
airport, with shops and restaurants peppered all along their length.  Typically however, 
the design of airports had been focused on getting people from the entrance, through 
security and to their gate as quickly as possible; what they might be do once they were 
there was often an afterthought.  In the world of commuter shuttles and walk-on booking 
that was a reasonable and effective design.  That design presents challenges in today’s 
much more time- intensive travel experience. 
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History of retail management in airports 
In the past, the great majority of airports either managed operations in house, with 
a dedicated staff, or contracted for various services through a RFQ/RFP process, and 
retail concessions were no exception.  The choice to outsource could cover the entire 
range of retail operations, or for a specific product segment.  The market segmentation in 
airports has five principal product categories – food and beverage, specialty retailing, 
news and gifts, duty free and general services – with different firms specializing in some 
products and not others, and a few that can service the entire market.  Major master 
concessionaires include HMSHost, formerly Host Marriott Services (news, gift and 
specialty retail, as well as food and beverage), Parodies Shops (specialty retail), CA One 
Services (both retail and food/beverage) and DFS Group (duty free). 
Generally the contracts ranged from 15 to 25 years with a single, integrated 
“master (or prime) concessionaire” entity providing the operating staff and management 
for the retail locations.  The advantage of this approach was a simplified interaction with 
the retail operation, which was considered outside the scope of an airport’s primary 
function.  Rather than having a staff to manage the dozens of retailers and operators, a 
single firm could provide one point of contact.  The airport received income from rent on 
the leased space and a concession fee from the master concessionaire, which was 
compensation for the effective monopoly the airport had granted. 
The concessionaires earned an operating profit, hiring their own staff to manage 
and operate those stores.  With airport employees starting to arrive at 4am, these 
concessionaires face high labor costs (as they were required to remain open for as many 
as 14 or more hours a day), as well as a high cost of inventory (airport retail locations are 
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significantly smaller than a similar space outside the airport, and limit the space available 
for preparation and inventory).  As a consequence much of these higher costs were 
captured in higher prices charged to the public, who had few other options.   
The first signs of change came with the introduction of two new concepts: 
branded stores and street pricing.  Part of the former joys of airport shopping was paying 
two or three times for the generic version of whatever it was you were buying.  As a 
customer your options were limited.  That had to change with the introduction of branded 
concepts.  Once the brand – that is to say, the reputation – of the outside company is at 
stake, they have an incentive to keep their customers happy with reasonable prices, even 
if they never pass through that airport or frequent that store again.  Brand signals the 
quality of the product you’re buying, and McDonald’s will not do a very good business if 
they ask you to pay twice as much for the comparable burger and fries as you would five 
minutes away from the airport.  This upset to the comfortable business environment 
stemmed from two experiments at opposite ends of the country. 
 
Early successes 
In 1988, Portland International Airport became the first airport in the country to 
experiment with the themed development of retail.  Dubbed “Oregon Market”, this 
central shopping and dining area was an attempt to market the unique culture and 
experience of the Pacific Northwest, with shops and restaurants that captured the local 
and regional flavor.  It initially opened with six specialty retail shops, oriented around a 
“main street” theme complete with clock tower to complete the street-like pedestrian 
experience.  The program was a success, and in 1994 expanded to include three 
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additional retail shops and nine food outlets.  Then in 1999, the model was extended with 
the creation of a concessions court Concourse C, which was recently expanded in 2001.  
All told, the retail program will encompass 110,000 square feet of retail.  Portland has 
also been the recipient of a number of awards, both locally and nationally.  In 2000, the 
program earned a Governor’s Livability Award from Livable Oregon for its success in 
reflecting the feeling of livability and values of the state.  In 2001, Portland distinguished 
itself among a peer group of medium sized hubs by placing first in three of the five 
categories in Airport Retail News’ annual Best Airport Concessions Poll.  In 2002, that 
impressive performance was surpassed when Portland took top honors in four of five 
categories.  Over time, Portland’s model has proven itself 
by continuing to strive for unique and interesting 
concepts that capture local flavor and that offer 
professional design and function.  Notably, one of the 
2002 judges made specific comment of Portland’s fair 
rent approach to its tenants, which reflects the airport’s macroscopic appreciation what it 
takes to make such a concept work.  
In 1992, another experiment was started at Pittsburg International Airport that 
took this concept to another level.  The airport brought in an affiliate of the United 
Kingdom’s BAA plc to replicate their successful redevelopment of the British Airways 
terminal at London’s Heathrow Airport.  BAA designed AIRMALL as a stylish 
shopping-mall- in-the-airport, on a scale much beyond anything that had been created 
before.  Enforcing the same “street pricing” as at Portland, the AIRMALL is centrally 
located at the nexus of all four of Pittsburgh’s concourses.  Once you pass through 
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security, you connect into the central core of AIRMALL, which you walk through to 
reach your specific concourse.  With almost all of the airport’s passenger traffic passing 
by the 100,000 square feet of retailing and 110 stores, some of them sole local outlets for 
national chains, the AIRMALL generates sales of $9.02 per enplaned passenger, much 
improved from the dismal $2.40 prior to the opening in 1992, and consistently ranking it 
at the top of its peers. 
AIRMALL position behind security has challenged it post-9/11, as non-ticketed 
customers can no longer enter the mall, but a sign of faith in the concept’s strength is the 
announcement in May 2002 of the opening of additional retailers, including Swarovski 
Crystal, Polished manicures and makeovers and Perfumania and the extensive renovation. 
 
Entry of third party developers   
With the entry of BAA at Pittsburg in 1992, the airport world awoke to the 
potential for retailing as a profit center.  And with the profit opportunity have come the 
developers.  From the world of traditional retailing, developers with the relationships to 
bring in brand named eateries and stores, the management skills to orchestrate the 
leasing, build-out and tenant relations, as well as the financial acumen and incentives to 
make the model work tried their hand.  There are anecdotes of developers sitting in 
Oregon Market over lunch, observing the bustling environment and going off to explore a 
similar opportunity for themselves.  A number of new firms entered, most with some 
prior connection to and experience with the airport environment, which would assist them 
in navigating the political landscape.  Building on their success at Pittsburgh, BAA 
continued to expand, and was joined by MarketPlace Development (a joint venture of a 
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major New England mall developer and a prior chairman of MassPort, which operates 
Logan Airport), LCOR (the US affiliate of the firm that developed Amsterdam’s 
Schiphol Airport), as well as international retailing behemoth Westfield Corporation.  
The financial structure of the development model is radically different from the 
concession model.  In most cases, the developer is bring a source of financing (which 
may be in concert with the airport’s providing low-cost municipal debt) as well as 
expertise in the role of general manager, and in exchange for developing and executing 
the leasing and tenant management function, it receives a partnership interest, generally 
20-25%.  As compared to the pure mall development model, airports are both smaller in 
square footage (at most 100,000 square feet versus a mall of 600-700,000 square feet), 
but their attraction is in the long term stability of the contract. 
 
Competitive response 
 
Since most concessionaires have long-term contracts with “their” airports, these 
development firms have faced a partially closed market as they have introduced their new 
brand of retail management.  Some airports have successfully brought in a developer 
when overhauling or expanding their facilities (such as Washington National, see case 
study later), or in a more limited fashion for selected portions of the airport.  For example 
Boston’s Logan Airport introduced Boston Landing, a smaller scale AIRMALL with 35 
specialty retail shops in its Terminal C, with the help of Westfield ; then, shortly before 
the prior contract for South Terminal was due to expire, MassPort appointed BAA as 
developer for Terminals B, D and E.  To date over a dozen airports have adopted the 
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developer model in whole or in part, but unsurprisingly the incumbent concessionaries 
have mounted a competitive response. 
Faced with the introduction of an invigorating array of specialty retailers and 
branded food and beverage providers, master concessionaires adopted a similar product 
offering as did developers, while remaining true to their operating model.  Still hiring and 
operating stores themselves, concessionaires began developing a franchise business and 
bring in such stores as PGA Tour golf shops, Brooks Brothers (both airport exclusives for 
Parodies Shops), Starbucks, Burger King and Chilis.  What is important to mention is that 
although the stores themselves offer branded products, from the airports perspective the 
financial relationship has not changed – they still receive rent and a concession fee rather 
than a share in operating profits.  So despite the evolution in the customer experience, 
this underlying issue remains one of the strategic differences between the two models, 
and impacts the strategic relationship with the airport. 
 
Impact of 9/11 
 The landscape of the country has changed since 9/11, and in no place more so 
than the aviation industry.  Security concerns have become paramount, to the point where 
Los Angeles has announced a multi-billion dollar off-site check- in system, in addition to 
the disruption that new security procedures and equipment already brings. 
 After 9/11, airports saw passenger traffic fall 20 to 30 percent, although over time 
ridership is improving.  Industry insiders project that it will take the better part of next 
year to work out the most pressing issues.  And with the fall-off in passenger volume, so 
has revenue from retail concessions, rental car, parking revenues and landing fees.  But 
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despite this grim situation, many airports have found their retail sales have not fallen as 
much as could be expected.  A large contributing factor in this is likely the longer dwell 
times travelers are experiencing.  With earlier check- ins, passengers have more time to 
spend, and they’ll spend it the restaurants and shops in the airport.  But all retail is not 
equal.  While in the past passengers felt comfortable spending the ir time in the central 
terminal, confident they could move through security quickly, most passengers today 
expect long lines at the security checkpoints, and generally go through to the concourses 
as soon as possible and spend their time there.  This has decimated the sales of ground-
side stores, with few exceptions.  At National Airport in Washington, DC, airport 
managers point to the design of the facility as encouraging people to stay in the central 
terminal.  With short concourses, travelers can see their gate from the central terminal 
and this, managers believe, gives passengers the comfort level they need to stay in the 
more relaxing environment of the central terminal. 
 Space is another constraint that redesigned security considerations are imposing 
on airport retail.  The new scanning machines mandated into every US airport are 
massive pieces of equipment.  Faced with little alternative, South Florida’s Ft. 
Lauderdale-Hollywood International has reduced the square footage available to the retail 
locations adjacent to security, and in some cases has decided they must give up those 
sites entirely.  The operation of stores has changed – steak is tough product to sell 
without steak knives – and shipments of the most basic staples, food and paper goods, 
must now be delivered in secured trucks and coordinated more closely with airport 
security.  With flexibility and coordination at a premium, the post-9/11 world will help 
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clarify the strategic differences between the different retail management models.  In the 
next section we look at those strategic consequences, both as related to 9/11 and beyond. 
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Strategic Issues 
 
Choice of management structure vs. format of retail environment 
 An important distinction needs to be made when between the function that 
management plays, and the form and design of the retail areas in the airport.  A consumer 
may not even be aware that there is one concession manager in the airport, and that the 
employees of the bookstores, restaurants and specialty retail stores all work for the same 
company.  In the past, that may have been indicated by the generic branding of the stores, 
but today’s concessionaires have made extensive use of franchising to bring branded 
retail to the airports in which they operate.  In addition, while an airport’s priority is not 
to create the most effective mall at the expense of passenger convenience and safety, an 
airport’s management can still outsource to a 3rd party or private developer to leverage 
the skills that they bring to the table. 
 
Three categories of management structure  
For purposes of comparison, we can describe three general categories of 
management structure; in reality, each airport may structure the relationship differently, 
and in many cases a hybrid exists among different product types or between different 
locations in the airport.  Firstly, the airport can manage tenants directly (“direct airport” 
model.)  In the pure form of this model, the airport has the staff with appropriate 
expertise to set the overall agenda of the retail program, recruit quality tenants and serve 
their needs on a ongoing basis; in some circumstances, the airport might outsource a part 
of that function to a 3rd party manager.  This provides the airport with greatest degree of 
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oversight and the potential to capture all the surplus profit, but it comes with some 
downsides.  Firstly, the airport has to be either so large as to support a full time staff, with 
commensurate expertise, or so small as to fit those responsibilities within a larger job 
description.   
More importantly, that oversight can become a liability.  Airports are often the 
local municipality’s largest asset, and are often beholden to the pressure of local 
politicians.  There have been recent allegations that a former Mayor of Atlanta influenced 
the selection of concession operators at Hartsfield Atlanta, circumventing the bidding of 
two concession contracts generating $20 million a year in revenue, among almost two 
dozen other contracts.  
The second major form is the modern adaptation of the traditional prime/master 
concessionaire.  Now offering branded retail at street prices, these concessionaires still 
make their money from operating profit, leasing the space from the airport on relatively 
long term leases, plus paying a concession fee to the airport.  There has been a growing 
trend towards the segmentation of RFQ/RFPs, which works well with this model.  For 
example, a firm might bid on the provision of themed restaurants throughout an airport, 
and a concessionaire with expertise in creating those types of eating environments could 
pick up two, three or more differently branded locations under one contract, without 
having pick up the bar contract, for example, as well.  This further segmenting of the 
contracts alleviates another downside of this model, that of the double optimization of 
profit that occurs when subletting.  If a concessionaire does not have the requisite 
expertise, the concessionaire sublets the space, adding their own profit margin (a rational 
choice on their part) in addition to the profit margin offered to the airport.  The net effect 
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is a higher rent to the tenant, forcing higher prices and thus sub-optimal performance for 
the airport.  This points to a more subtle issue – concessionaires are rewarded by 
maximizing operating profit, which is not the same goal as the airport’s after the long 
term contact has been signed.  The next model attempts to align those interests more 
closely. 
Under the third party or privately owned developer model, the airport partners 
with a development organization that takes responsibility for all aspects of the retail 
environment and fully shares the risks with the airport.  For example, neither the airport 
nor LCOR Schiphol, which runs JFK’s Terminal 4 program, has drawn a profit since 
9/11, but LCOR is choosing to weather the storm because of JFK’s long, successful track 
record.  They had made an initial investment which committed them to the project over 
the long term.  The downside to this alignment of interests is that the risks that the airport 
is now sharing may bring down the private sector partner.  Under the concessionaire 
model, the manager passes on rental income; here the manager may make the decision to 
renege on their contract with the airport in the face of a long period of no or minimal 
profit.  Similarly, when times are not good, there is less profit to go around, and the 
airport may wish to renege and renegotiate with the manager.  As a partner, rather than a 
tenant or vendor, both sides of the relationship are exposed to the risks of the other trying 
to change the relationship midstream.  On the other hand, this model is well suited to an 
uncertain environment if both parties understand the risks they are taking on, and are 
compensated fairly for them. 
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Political considerations  
Since airports are often a division of their local municipality, that separation from 
control of tenant selection under the developer model is no mean feat.  Otherwise subject 
to local politics, the airport can claim to have washed its hands of the tenant selection 
process; of course, how uninvolved depends on the particular circumstances in the airport 
and the terms of the contract with the developer.  An airport that has historically been 
involved in every aspect of tenant selection might find it difficult to give up control of the 
tenants, or as indicated above, may consider that to be the least attractive part of their job 
and happily hand it off to the outside developer.  But perhaps even more contentious is 
the profit sharing relationship.  The transparency of airport operations to the political 
process makes profit sharing a frequent hot topic.  In the positive growth years of the 
1990s, with everyone making money, that has been manageable, but with the future more 
uncertain, that issue may rise to the fore.  On the other hand, the developer model gives 
as good as it gets – in the months since 9/11, many developers have made no money on 
their projects, but stay involved for the long haul in the conviction that the airline market 
is sound.  The financial benefits of the developer model will be explored more fully in the 
later section on Data Analysis. 
 
Organizational models  
The issues discussed above can be encapsulated in the classic tradeoff between 
control and incentive in and between organizations.  On one extreme, with the direct 
model you can have absolute control over the process with absolute clarity as to direction 
and alignment of purpose.  But the sacrifice is in incentive and motivation – no 
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bureaucracy, even a benevolent one, can hope to attract as broad a range of skills and as 
full a commitment to the cause as an independent , profit-seeking entity.  But a separate 
organization is rightly looking out for its own best interests first – and if the long term 
profits and cost of a damaged reputation didn’t justify the continued investment, then that 
separate organization can and should exit the market.  Post-9/11 these considerations may 
seem less abstract and an awareness of the theoretical possibilities can shed some insight 
on the subject. 
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Analysis of Sales Performance Data 
Data Sources 
 To ascertain whether there is a quantifiable difference in sales performance 
between these various models, we made use of two primary sources of numerical data.  
The first, published in the Airport Retail News (ARN) Factbook, is the product of an 
annual survey of airports that started in 1997.  In 2000, the last year for which data was 
available, the Factbook included 70 domestic airports, including all the large hubs, 22 of 
the 35 medium hubs, and four Canadian airports.   ARN has collected data on passenger 
traffic, gross sales, gross sales per enplaned passenger and airport revenue broken down 
by product (food & beverage, specialty retail, news & gifts, duty free and general 
services); in addition, for each airport they list square footage by product and tenant, as 
well as lease maturities.  Where provided by the airport, these figures are further broken 
down by concourse and terminal. 
 The second data set was provided courtesy of the Metro Washington Airport 
Authority.  For 2000 and 2001, the majority of large and medium airports participated in 
an email survey, and reported sales broken down into food & beverage and retail, airside 
and groundside, and for each product type the concession management model used by the 
airport.  As small number of large and medium hub airports are missing from this data 
set, ARN data was used to supplement them.  The separation of airside versus groundside 
sales is not available across all airports, and has been ignored for the purposes of a 
comparative analysis, although it is clear that a forecasting model would rely heavily on 
that subset of the data. 
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 The challenge with making use of both these data sources is the short history – 
four years in the first case and two in the second.  Ideally, we would like to see data that 
spans over an airport’s introduction of a new retailing model.  A number of airports made 
that transition just before the start of the earlier data set; others are currently undergoing 
construction with completion dates over the next one to two years.  Another is resolving 
the discrepancies between data sets regarding enplanements; ARN data is published 
before the final figures are calculated by the Federal Aviation Administration, and the 
MWAA survey has self-reported data.  For the most part the differences are minor, but in 
a few cases there may be timing issues (fiscal versus calendar year, for example.)  This is 
directly relevant, as a key measure of performance is sales per enplanement, and different 
enplanement figures will give different values for this metric, even with agreement on the 
sales level.  The net effect is to reduce the accuracy of the data to +/- $0.15.  A more 
fundamental issue is the predictive power of aggregate data at the airport level.  More 
specific conclusions could be drawn from the volume of sales (rather than dollar volume) 
of comparable items, such as pulp paperback or cheeseburgers, across many airports and 
time periods.  
 Despite all these shortcomings, the data provides clear direction as the relative 
performance of developer vs. concessionaire vs. directly run programs, both in the 2000 
base year, and over time.  While a longer or more detailed data set might prove to reduce 
the uncertainty as to the magnitude of difference in performance between groups – and 
might increase or decrease it -- the differences between the models is clear, as will be 
demonstrated in the following sections. 
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Metrics 
 From the perspective of the traditional retailer, gross sales per square foot is a 
principal measure of performance.  In the typical urban or suburban environment, each 
retail center competes with the others within the MSA (metropolitan statistical area) for 
the disposable income of various population segments.  Retail sales in an airport are 
driven by very different factors.  Firstly, there is a captive audience.  Not many people go 
to the airport to shop; most travelers are trying to fill their time as productively as they 
can.  Secondly, the great majority of airplane passengers are traveling for business or on 
vacation, and in either case their ‘willingness to pay’, a measure of the profit available for 
capture when transacting with them, is higher than under other, more banal, 
circumstances.  Lastly, airport retail is an exceedingly local business.  In the language of 
real estate economics, the commuting cost between airports is infinite – you don’t travel 
from one airport to another to purchase an item – and thus the productivity of a retail 
store is driven not by its size and turnover, but by the people close enough to pass by the 
front door – in other words exposed passenger traffic.  More specifically, exposed 
enplanements, as debarking passengers rarely spend more time in the airport than they 
have to.  (A passenger on a stop-over or waiting for a connecting flight counts as a 
separate enplanement.) 
 
Analysis 
 In the Tables and Figures section below, Figure 1 (Food & Beverage), Figure 2 
(Retail) and Figure 3 (Total Sales) show that the distribution of sales per enplaned 
passengers across all the airports in the MWAA data set (which includes the large hub 
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airports and 10 medium hubs) falls in a broad band between $2.50 and $3.50 per EP for 
food & beverage, $1.00 and $3.50 for retail.  At this level of analysis, when grouping the 
airports by management structure, the variation among food & beverages does not 
distinguish one model over the other, but in retail, the developer group seems to have a 
better track record than either master operator or direct airport management. 
 To refine our observations, we looked more closely at the ARN data, and selected 
a subset at the subset for which we have sales performance data throughout the 1997 to 
2000 period.  This dropped 13 airports from our data set of 55.  Focusing on retail 
performance (comprised of specialty retail and news/books, as this data was often 
reported together from some airports and separately from others), we grouped them into 
five categories:  the three straight-forward models discussed above, and two hybrids, 
airport direct / master concessionaire and “other” which included a partially developer 
run airport. 
The principal observation with the specialty retail product type is that sales per 
enplaned passenger are far and away higher with airports that are managed by developers, 
but more significantly, over the 1997-2000 time-period the group of developers increased 
that lead enormously.  (See Table 2 in Tables and Figures section.)  In 2000, the average 
developer-managed airport brought in $3.23 in retail per EP, while the average prime 
contractor managed airport brought in $1.67, a significant differential, but all the more 
impressive considering that the average developer-managed airport in 1997 brought in 
$0.99 per EP, and the average prime concessionaire managed airport $1.35 ($2.24 
improvement versus $0.32).  Of course, averages can be deceiving, but when we looked 
at the changes at individual airports, we found that fully 75% of the developer-managed 
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airports increased by at least $1.40, while the 75th percentile for increases at prime-
concessionaire managed airports was only $0.09 per enplaned passenger. 
On the other hand, the distribution of outcomes was much broader at developer-
managed airports – there were some significant outlying data points to the upside.  In 
2000, the spread between the top and bottom quartile of prime-concessionaire managed 
airports was $0.54, while $1.79 among those managed by developers.  Since even the 
best performing concession-run airports did not increase significantly (top quartile shifted 
from $1.86 from $1.82), this is almost entirely due to an increase in the bottom 
performers.  A possible explanation for this behavior is as a competitive “tightening of 
the pack”, as less well performing concession-managed airports increased their focus on 
performing more in line with their peers, considering the attention that the presence of 
developers had brought to specialty retail. 
As a comparison, airports that ran their specialty retail franchises directly had a 
similar performance profile to concession-run airports – the spread between top and 
bottom quartiles tightened from $1.28 to $1.07, while the average shifted upwards by 
$0.52 to $1.88, with the increase at the median airport of $0.07 even lower than at 
concession-run airports (where it was a slight increase of $0.23).   Compare this to 
developer-run airports where the median airport improved by $1.48! 
Interestingly, those firms that combined direct management by the airport with 
master-concessionaire programs did better than either alone.  Those airports already 
started out ahead of direct- and concessionaire-managed airports (for the most part – their 
sales were closely distributed around $1.72 in 1997); by 2000 they had maintained that 
tight distribution while increasing average sales per enplaned passenger ($2.28 vs. $1.88 
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and 1.67), but were still not within striking distance of the developer-managed group (top 
quartile of hybrid-managed airports were above $2.50, but bottom quartile of developer-
managed airports was $2.68). 
 Similar observations can be made with regard to food & beverage sales.  The 
average developer-managed airports improved $1.51 over the time period, compared to 
$0.54 (airport direct) and $0.48 (concessionaire).  In 2000, all three groups had similar 
tight ranges around that mean (top 25% to bottom 25% ranged from $0.46 to $0.37, not 
significantly different given our data.)   However, this was an improvement for developer 
airports, which started out 1997 with a range of $0.76 versus $0.50 (concessionaire) and 
$0.39 (airport direct).  Given the same logic as above, it’s possible that developers had a 
learning curve to climb with regard to food & beverage.  Again, direct airport-prime 
concessionaire hybrids did better than either alone, but not quite as well on average as the 
group of developer airports. 
On the whole, though, this is a minor point in the context of the larger 
observation: by 2000 developer airports as a whole did better than their peers, even 
though some concession-run programs (especially the joint direct airport-concessionaire 
hybrids) might have outperformed a number of developer-run programs.  This can be 
observed visually in Figures 4, 5 and 6 (see Chart and Figures section below.) 
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Case Studies 
 
 In this section, we look at two airports – one deve loper run in part, the other 
operated directly by the airport – to explore some of the issues raised in the previous 
sections.    
 
 
Chicago Midway Airport (MDW) 
Midway Airport (2000 FAA ranking #32), sister airport to the #2 ranked Chicago-
O’Hare International, exemplifies the redesign of an airport terminal with attention to the 
creation of a retailing atmosphere.  In 1997, the City of Chicago began an ambitious $761 
million revitalization of Midway Airport, the 7-year Terminal Development Program.  As 
part of the program, Midway has built an integrated municipal subway stop, a new 
parking garage, and an impressive pedestrian bridge to a renovated terminal with 41 new 
gates.   
The investment in new infrastructure was well overdue.  Sales per enplaned 
passenger totaled $3 in both 1999 and 2000 (around $2 per EP for food & beverage and 
$1 in specialty retail and news & gifts), giving Midway the unenviable distinction of the 
second lowest sales performance per EP, both among its peer group of medium hubs 
(which averaged $4.40), as well as the overall airport network (which averaged $5.16 per 
EP in 2000.)  As with other successful concession programs, such as Portland’s 
OregonMarket and Pittsburgh’s AIRMALL, “Midway Boulevard” includes a mix of 23 
national specialty stores as well as local Chicago favorites, with a notably high proportion 
of food and beverage concessions.  Like Portland, the Airport Authority has made the 
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commitment to developing this concept internally, and has worked closely with potential 
tenants and the public to see it off successfully. 
The ribbon cutting ceremony for the 23,000 square feet of new concessions was 
on August 28, 2001 (see images at the end of this section).  Another 24,000 square feet of 
food & beverage and retail space is scheduled to open in the adjacent concourses at the 
completion of the development program in 2004.  The development plan for the full 
program called for the concessionaires’ contribution of $12.8 million toward tenant 
improvements, with gross sales projected at $39 million annually, and a 13% concession 
fee to the airport – on the high end for medium sized airports, but 9/11 has certainly 
changed the equation here, as elsewhere.  Working in Midway’s favor is the placement of 
the concessions triangle on the airside, after security, with clear vantage points to three 
terminals, and a preponderance of food & beverage, which from anecdotal evidence 
seems to come back at airports around the country more strongly than retail. 
Unfortunately, sales data for 2001 was not available at the time this report was 
printed, but Midway is a good test case for the retail concept.  Quantifying the effects of 
9/11 will be difficult, as the gross sales/EP metric may very well have to be adjusted; a 
closer look at the difference in product categories (food & beverage versus specialty 
retail and news & gifts) is warranted.  In addition, Chicago has made a significant 
commitment in time and money to the revitalization of Midway; not every airport or 
municipal authority has the luxury of starting from the ground up.  
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Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) 
 National Airport is the nation’s 31st largest airport, serving 17.5 million enplaning 
passengers in 2000, bringing it in just above the cutoff between large and small hubs.  As 
short-haul airport, DCA primarily serves the US cities within 1250 miles.  In 1999 that 
mandate was extended to include daily round-trips to Denver, Phoenix, Las Vegas and 
Seattle.  On July 27, 1997, the “new” B/C Terminal opened, with 1 million square feet of 
space – 35 gates, 100 ticket counters, 12 baggage claims, and the Cesar Pelli designed 
“National Hall”, a main street for nearly 100 shops and eateries on the concourse level, 
with a mix of national, local and regional retail and food concessions. 
 
 
 
Prior to the new terminal, National was a classic case of direct leasing – a few retail 
stores, newsstands and the like.  The new terminal encompasses 61,000 square feet of 
retail and food & beverage.  Remarkably, National is among few airports in the country 
that have seen an increase in ground-side sales (pre-security) since 9/11, from $6 per EP 
to $8, putting it in the top 5 airports in the country.  From National Hall (pictured above), 
the gates extend out on three piers, all less than 100’ in length.  This is in contrast to an 
airport like Boston’s Logan, where gates are situated at the end of long concourses, 
requiring people to go through security earlier. 
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 Initially, the program at National ran into challenges.  Managers there point 
toward too many nationally branded stores; since then they’ve introduced a mix of local 
and regional names as well as national.  Having Westfield as the outside developer 
helped pull the program together, from bringing in franchisees such as McDonald’s to 
running the competitive bid without entanglements into DC politics, adapting quickly to 
the early changes, as well as the ones since 9/11.  The relationship with Westfield has 
worked well, with a roughly 25%-75% partnership split (25% to Westfield, 75% to the 
airport); HMSHost ran the food & beverage program on a 50%-50% basis (this was their 
first foray into the developer model), but has found that they are more comfortable 
leveraging their traditional operational expertise as vendors. 
 Since the opening of the new terminal, sales per enplanement have risen from 
around $4.50 to over $6.25 – and then to $8 after 9/11, bringing in over $6 million in 
revenue (on $50 million in sales) to the airport in 2000.  This represents a doubling of 
income to the airport as compared to prior to the construction of the new terminal.  Much 
of that is due to the sales volume that came from the added retail space, but it does 
demonstrate that there is revenue to capture.  On the other hand, this was an expensive 
renovation, and you could not justify such an elaborate terminal on the basis of improved 
performance of retail and food concessions!  What it does demonstrate is that thoughtful 
integration of revenue capture when redesigning a terminal can improve an airport’s 
balance sheet significantly.  In 2000, National’s revenue was $130 million overall, $60 
million of which from non-airline sources (parking, concessions, advertising).  In other 
words, 10% of the non-airline revenue – or 4.6% of the airports total revenue – was 
derived from retailing. 
- 32 - 
Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research 
 
 
 A little more than ten years after the first shot was fired in the revolution of 
airport retailing, the landscape has changed forever.  From a sales volume perspective, 
the developer model seems to have an advantage, although the best of the concessionaire 
and directly run programs often perform superbly.  Over the short term, airports around 
the country will be facing difficult times, but with projections of continued growth, and 
increased delays, it will only become more important for airports to capitalize on the 
profit center represented by retailing.  There are a number of considerations that industry 
participants must address. 
Firstly, although this evolution is a slow process, given the entrenched interests 
and long contract times, this is a trend that is now reaching an inflection point that 
foretells more rapid change.  The pace of change – whether it be to a totally developer 
run programs like Pittsburgh or a hybrid of airport/concessionaire/developer food court (a 
la Boston Landing) – will only accelerate as contracts are renewed on a 5 year versus a 
15 year cycle.  Secondly, airports and developers must appreciate the differences and 
challenges of dealing with a public-private partnership rather than a purely financial 
vendor relationship.  Investing in airport-based projects is generally a stable investment, 
but there are political and organizational hurdles to be overcome.  The concessionaire 
model had adapted to this politicized environment, and the changes that have already 
occurred reflect those organizations to change with the times.  However, it is not clear, 
and the data does not support the argument, that the deep knowledge of the airport 
industry will enable them to compete head to head with a developer program.  The 
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structural difference created by profit sharing, as compared to fixed rental payments, 
seems to support the classic argument of coordination versus incentive to produce.   
With the fragmentation of RFQs and RFPs to smaller and smaller projects, the 
concessionaries will find themselves competing on the basis of more narrowly defined 
expertise for less extensive projects.  Whether the current field of development firms can 
afford to all remain in the industry under these conditions is highly doubtful.  There are 
only a handful of airports that offer the choice projects that meet the investment criteria 
of the largest development firms, and once those are redeveloped, there may be 
significant firm exits from the industry.  For those that do win projects, there will be a 
steadily growing income stream directly tied into two key drivers of the US economy – 
consumer spending and travel. 
 The directions for additional research are clear:  as time passes the historical data 
set that is easily available is growing and additional data going back to the early 1990s is 
available through the Freedom of Information Act.  As the conversions at developer-run 
airports are completed during the 2002 to 2004 time-frame, a broader set of comparative 
data will become available.  In addition, with the expected growth of hybrid awards 
within a particular airport, further analysis and disaggregating of the components of the 
“hybrid” model should provide much fruitful labor. 
 - 34 -
Tables and Figures
 
Table 1: FAA Large and Medium Hub Airports  
  PRIMARY AIRPORT ENPLANEMENT ACTIVITY SUMMARY FOR CY2000 10/19/2001 
Rank LOCID Airport Name Associated City ST Enplanements Hub 
1 ATL THE WILLIAM B HARTSFIELD AT ATLANTA GA 39,277,901 Large 
2 ORD CHICAGO O'HARE INTL CHICAGO IL 33,845,895 Large 
3 LAX LOS ANGELES INTL LOS ANGELES CA 32,167,896 Large 
4 DFW DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATI DALLAS-FORT WORTH TX 28,274,512 Large 
5 SFO SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL SAN FRANCISCO CA 19,556,795 Large 
6 DEN DENVER INTL DENVER CO 18,382,940 Large 
7 PHX PHOENIX SKY HARBOR INTL PHOENIX AZ 18,094,251 Large 
8 LAS MC CARRAN INTL LAS VEGAS NV 17,425,214 Large 
9 DTW DETROIT METROPOLITAN WAYNE DETROIT MI 17,326,775 Large 
10 EWR NEWARK INTL NEWARK NJ 17,212,226 Large 
11 MSP MINNEAPOLIS-ST PAUL INTL/WO MINNEAPOLIS MN 16,959,014 Large 
12 MIA MIAMI INTL MIAMI FL 16,489,341 Large 
13 IAH GEORGE BUSH INTERCONTINENTA HOUSTON TX 16,358,035 Large 
14 JFK JOHN F KENNEDY INTL NEW YORK NY 16,155,437 Large 
15 STL LAMBERT-ST LOUIS INTL ST LOUIS MO 15,288,493 Large 
16 MCO ORLANDO INTL ORLANDO FL 14,831,648 Large 
17 SEA SEATTLE-TACOMA INTL SEATTLE WA 13,875,942 Large 
18 BOS GENERAL EDWARD LAWRENCE 
LOG 
BOSTON MA 13,613,507 Large 
19 LGA LA GUARDIA  NEW YORK NY 12,697,208 Large 
20 PHL PHILADELPHIA INTL PHILADELPHIA  PA 12,294,051 Large 
21 CLT CHARLOTTE/DOUGLAS INTL CHARLOTTE NC 11,469,282 Large 
22 CVG CINCINNATI/NORTHERN KENTUCK COVINGTON/CINCINNATI KY 11,223,966 Large 
23 HNL HONOLULU INTL HONOLULU HI 11,174,701 Large 
24 PIT PITTSBURGH INTERNATIONAL PITTSBURGH PA 9,871,995 Large 
25 BWI BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTL BALTIMORE MD 9,675,681 Large 
26 IAD WASHINGTON DULLES INTERNATI CHANTILLY VA 9,643,275 Large 
27 SLC SALT LAKE CITY INTL SALT LAKE CITY UT 9,522,344 Large 
28 TPA TAMPA INTL TAMPA FL 7,969,797 Large 
29 SAN SAN DIEGO INTL-LINDBERGH FL SAN DIEGO CA 7,898,360 Large 
30 FLL FORT LAUDERDALE/HOLLYWOOD I FORT LAUDERDALE FL 7,817,173 Large 
31 DCA RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON 
NA 
ARLINGTON VA 7,517,811 Large 
32 MDW CHICAGO MIDWAY CHICAGO IL 7,059,520 Medium 
33 PDX PORTLAND INTL PORTLAND OR 6,754,514 Medium 
34 CLE CLEVELAND-HOPKINS INTL CLEVELAND OH 6,269,516 Medium 
35 SJC SAN JOSE INTERNATIONAL SAN JOSE CA 6,170,384 Medium 
36 MCI KANSAS CITY INTL KANSAS CITY MO 5,903,296 Medium 
37 MEM MEMPHIS INTL MEMPHIS TN 5,684,619 Medium 
38 OAK METROPOLITAN OAKLAND INTL OAKLAND CA 5,196,451 Medium 
39 RDU RALEIGH-DURHAM INTL RALEIGH/DURHAM NC 5,191,077 Medium 
40 SJU LUIS MUNOZ MARIN INTL SAN JUAN PR 5,135,591 Medium 
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41 MSY NEW ORLEANS INTL/MOISANT FL NEW ORLEANS LA 4,936,271 Medium 
42 BNA NASHVILLE INTL NASHVILLE TN 4,479,909 Medium 
43 HOU WILLIAM P HOBBY HOUSTON TX 4,354,609 Medium 
44 SMF SACRAMENTO INTERNATIONAL SACRAMENTO CA 3,979,043 Medium 
45 SNA JOHN WAYNE AIRPORT-ORANGE C SANTA ANA  CA 3,914,051 Medium 
46 IND INDIANAPOLIS INTL INDIANAPOLIS IN 3,833,975 Medium 
47 BDL BRADLEY INTL WINDSOR LOCKS CT 3,651,943 Medium 
48 AUS AUSTIN-BERGSTROM INTL AUSTIN TX 3,648,600 Medium 
49 DAL DALLAS LOVE FIELD DALLAS TX 3,596,052 Medium 
50 SAT SAN ANTONIO INTL SAN ANTONIO TX 3,528,955 Medium 
51 CMH PORT COLUMBUS INTL COLUMBUS OH 3,441,286 Medium 
52 ONT ONTARIO INTL ONTARIO CA 3,197,795 Medium 
53 ABQ ALBUQUERQUE INTL SUNPORT ALBUQUERQUE NM 3,148,780 Medium 
54 MKE GENERAL MITCHELL INTERNATIO MILWAUKEE WI 3,089,592 Medium 
55 OGG KAHULUI KAHULUI HI 2,999,863 Medium 
56 PBI PALM BEACH INTL WEST PALM BEACH FL 2,928,658 Medium 
57 RNO RENO/TAHOE INTERNATIONAL RENO NV 2,732,837 Medium 
58 PVD THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN STAT PROVIDENCE RI 2,684,204 Medium 
59 JAX JACKSONVILLE INTL JACKSONVILLE FL 2,616,211 Medium 
60 RSW SOUTHWEST FLORIDA INTL FORT MYERS FL 2,574,322 Medium 
61 ANC TED STEVENS ANCHORAGE INTL ANCHORAGE AK 2,503,138 Medium 
62 BUR BURBANK-GLENDALE-PASADENA BURBANK CA 2,380,531 Medium 
63 BUF BUFFALO NIAGARA INTL BUFFALO NY 2,140,002 Medium 
64 SDF LOUISVILLE INTL-STANDIFORD LOUISVILLE KY 1,974,269 Medium 
65 OMA EPPLEY AIRFIELD OMAHA NE 1,861,057 Medium 
66 TUS TUCSON INTL TUCSON AZ 1,804,086 Medium 
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Table 2: Analysis of ARN data 1997-2000 
    1997 2000 
Change at each airport 
1997-2000 
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.72 2.31 1.41 -1.15 -1.22 -0.08 
25% 3.06 1.93 1.08 4.23 2.42 1.49 0.37 0.35 -0.01 
average 3.27 2.01 1.36 4.58 2.55 1.88 0.55 0.39 0.07 
75% 5.71 2.32 2.36 5.31 2.85 2.56 1.17 0.80 0.52 
max 6.62 3.55 4.46 7.04 3.15 4.49 4.59 2.71 1.88 
skew -0.42 -0.87 0.96 1.13 0.65 1.62 1.44 0.52 1.84 
kurtosis 0.10 2.81 0.93 0.39 -0.94 2.51 3.04 2.59 3.09 A
irp
or
t D
ire
ct
ly
 
count 8.00                 
min 1.34 0.36 0.64 1.15 0.70 0.44 0.09 -0.02 -0.29 
25% 3.20 1.79 1.02 3.78 2.29 1.36 0.59 0.35 0.09 
average 3.54 2.08 1.35 4.05 2.56 1.67 0.76 0.48 0.23 
75% 3.97 2.29 1.82 4.76 2.75 1.86 0.88 0.56 0.39 
max 4.46 2.64 2.08 5.31 3.17 2.69 2.50 2.29 0.78 
skew -1.25 -1.66 0.10 -1.82 -2.08 0.18 1.85 2.61 0.08 
kurtosis 1.48 3.81 -1.05 5.60 6.38 1.24 5.16 8.44 0.66 P
rim
e 
O
pe
ra
to
r 
count 17.00                 
min 2.78 0.00 0.00 5.68 3.00 2.39 -0.90 0.61 1.33 
25% 2.79 1.79 0.95 5.73 3.15 2.68 1.94 0.93 1.40 
average 4.45 1.84 0.99 6.38 3.35 3.23 2.42 1.16 1.48 
75% 5.98 2.55 1.90 7.99 3.52 4.47 2.89 1.56 1.73 
max 8.89 2.65 3.33 8.40 3.59 4.81 2.95 3.52 4.47 
skew 0.99 -1.50 0.79 0.47 -0.30 0.33 -1.89 1.75 2.17 
kurtosis 0.20 2.49 0.72 -2.83 -1.85 -2.66 3.68 3.29 4.74 
D
ev
el
op
er
 
count 5.00                 
min 2.59 1.53 1.06 4.26 2.50 1.67 0.27 -0.12 -0.39 
25% 3.41 2.02 1.31 4.90 2.87 1.91 0.94 0.65 0.21 
average 4.10 2.25 1.72 5.35 3.05 2.28 1.27 0.73 0.47 
75% 4.78 2.61 2.02 5.85 3.34 2.50 1.65 0.95 0.64 
max 5.96 3.22 3.00 7.37 3.61 4.27 2.45 1.52 2.25 
skew 0.16 0.31 0.75 0.83 -0.13 1.62 0.32 -0.26 1.27 
kurtosis -0.49 -0.37 -0.25 0.08 -0.98 2.82 0.05 0.87 1.88 
A
irp
or
t/O
pe
ra
to
r 
hy
br
id
 
count 10.00                 
min 4.90 2.38 2.39 2.65 1.79 0.87 -2.68 -0.59 -2.09 
25% 5.01 2.41 2.53 3.18 2.08 1.10 -2.05 -0.33 -1.72 
average 5.12 2.44 2.67 3.71 2.37 1.33 -1.41 -0.07 -1.34 
75% 5.23 2.48 2.82 4.23 2.67 1.57 -0.78 0.19 -0.97 
max 5.34 2.51 2.96 4.76 2.96 1.80 -0.14 0.45 -0.59 
skew n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
kurtosis n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
O
th
er
/d
ev
el
op
er
 h
yb
rid
 
count 2.00                 
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Figure 1  
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 Figure 2 
 
Retail - Large Hubs
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Figure 3 
Overall Sales - Large Hubs
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Figure 5
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